Trump, Netanyahu, and the high-stakes ceasefire bet in Gaza
A U.S.-backed framework offers Hamas a constrained exit or renewed war—while sidelining the questions that have defied resolution for decades
Image: President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (file photo)
On September 29, 2025, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a 20-point U.S.-backed peace proposal for Gaza. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire, hostage exchanges, phased Israeli withdrawal, and dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure under international oversight. Trump proposed personally chairing a “Board of Peace” to manage the transition. Netanyahu endorsed the framework publicly, warning that Hamas rejection would trigger renewed military operations with full American support. The proposal excluded Hamas and the Palestinian Authority from its drafting, raising legitimacy concerns across the Arab world despite some cautious regional support. Hamas has not yet formally responded. Its decision will determine whether Gaza moves toward a supervised transition or returns to war, since acceptance would reshape governance while rejection would likely bring intensified Israeli operations.
The strategic context
The proposal comes after two years of war that has killed an estimated 45,000–50,000 Palestinians (according to Gaza Health Ministry figures, with unverified distinctions between combatants and civilians) and about 1,800 Israelis, mostly from the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks and subsequent fighting. Israel’s stated objective since 2023 has been to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities and governing authority, while Hamas has demanded Israeli withdrawal and lifting of the blockade imposed since 2007.
Earlier ceasefire attempts brokered by Egypt and Qatar collapsed over sequencing. Israel insisted on maintaining security presence during hostage releases, while Hamas demanded full withdrawal first. The new proposal attempts to resolve this through phased implementation with international guarantees, though similar mechanisms have proven fragile in the past, as with the Oslo Accords.
Three dynamics define the present moment. First, military exhaustion: Israel has inflicted heavy damage on Hamas’s tunnels and command networks but faces concerns from its security establishment over indefinite occupation. Second, hostage pressure: around 100–120 Israeli and foreign nationals remain in Hamas custody, creating intense political pressure at home. Third, U.S. politics: Trump’s personal involvement suggests a bid for foreign policy success ahead of the 2026 midterms, increasing the weight of sustained American engagement.
The proposal’s architecture
The 20-point framework is organized into four phases, though the full text has not been released. Based on official briefings:
Phase one (days 1–30): Immediate ceasefire; exchange of all hostages for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners; creation of humanitarian corridors monitored by the UN and Arab League.
Phase two (months 2–6): Partial Israeli withdrawal from urban centers to perimeter positions; deployment of international peacekeepers, with Jordan and Egypt mentioned as possible contributors; dismantling of Hamas military infrastructure under international supervision.
Phase three (months 7–18): Establishment of a transitional governance body—the “Board of Peace,” chaired by Trump or a U.S. designee, including representatives from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and “technocratic Palestinian representatives.” The process for selecting Palestinian participants remains unclear, as does any Palestinian Authority role.
Phase four (18+ months): Movement toward permanent-status talks; disbursement of reconstruction funds tied to governance benchmarks; gradual reduction of Israeli presence based on verified demilitarization.
Major uncertainties remain. The plan does not define how demilitarization would be verified, who decides the Palestinian representation, or what enforcement exists for violations. PA President Mahmoud Abbas criticized the absence of defined Palestinian Authority involvement, warning that Palestinian rights and representation were not adequately reflected.
Hamas’s calculus
Hamas must choose between limited survival within a tightly constrained framework or rejection that risks more intense military assault. Acceptance could allow some administrative presence through “technocratic representatives” while halting immediate military pressure. Rejection could bring Israeli operations with expanded U.S. backing.
Internal divisions complicate deliberations. Hamas’s external leadership, such as Khaled Mashal in Doha, has sometimes shown flexibility in negotiations, while leaders inside Gaza have historically resisted compromise as a threat to Hamas’s model.
Three factors shape the decision. First, survival: the group has suffered major losses but retains parts of its infrastructure. Acceptance might preserve what remains. Second, public opinion: polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in June 2025 showed 62% of Gazans favoring a ceasefire even with concessions, up from 41% in December 2024, reflecting war fatigue. Third, regional pressure: Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have indicated they will not oppose implementation if Hamas agrees, leaving the group increasingly isolated.
Opposition within Hamas argues that accepting the plan would entrench Israeli security control and international trusteeship, which they consider defeat. Netanyahu’s parallel statements about Israel’s right to resume operations reinforce these fears, casting the proposal as conditional occupation rather than real sovereignty.
Netanyahu’s political imperatives
For Netanyahu, the proposal serves both domestic and strategic aims. At home, it addresses demands from hostage families and military officials concerned about the costs of indefinite operations. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reportedly told Israeli media in recent weeks that further military gains were unlikely without a governance plan.
Strategically, Netanyahu shifts responsibility for post-conflict governance to an international structure while ensuring strong U.S. involvement by placing Trump at its head. This recalls the 2020 Abraham Accords, where normalization advanced while Palestinian issues were deferred.
The risk is that Hamas rejection forces renewed operations without a clear exit. If Trump’s political influence declines after the 2026 midterms or otherwise, Israel may find itself without U.S. cover just as international opposition to ongoing war grows.
Regional reactions and legitimacy deficits
Regional responses have been cautious. Egypt and Jordan, likely to carry much of the peacekeeping burden, welcomed U.S. involvement but stressed that solutions must be Palestinian-led and linked to statehood prospects, implicitly tying their cooperation to Palestinian Authority participation.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia support stability in Gaza as part of wider regional integration but face domestic skepticism of externally imposed frameworks. Saudi statements referenced “legitimate Palestinian rights” and “international law,” indicating doubts about bypassing sovereignty claims.
Qatar, historically a mediator and host to Hamas leaders, has been excluded from this round. Qatari officials have reportedly told U.S. counterparts that leaving them out undermines credibility with Hamas, possibly reducing chances of acceptance.
The central legitimacy issue is Palestinian representation. The Palestinian Authority, though weakened, remains the recognized representative body. Replacing it with vaguely defined “technocratic” figures risks creating governance without real constituency, leaving the arrangement fragile.
Operational constraints and implementation risks
Implementation faces three major obstacles:
First, peacekeeping composition. No major power has offered troops, and regional states require clarity on rules of engagement and timelines. Without this, missions risk drifting, as seen with the long-running UN force in Lebanon.
Second, demilitarization verification. Israel demands security oversight; Hamas sees this as occupation. The plan refers to international monitors but gives no details on weapons accounting, dispute resolution, or enforcement. Past ceasefires, such as the 2012 Egyptian-mediated deal, collapsed over such gaps.
Third, reconstruction. Gaza needs $15–20 billion in reconstruction (World Bank/UN estimates, July 2025). The proposal mentions international funding but provides little on disbursement or conditionality. Tying aid to externally set benchmarks can erode local legitimacy and create dependency on foreign approval rather than community support.
Measuring strategic success
If Hamas accepts, four indicators will show whether the framework stabilizes or unravels:
Hostage release: Full completion during phase one would signal commitment. Delays or partial releases would undermine trust.
IDF withdrawal and security: Smooth withdrawals with few incidents would validate the approach. Escalations would increase pressure on Israel to re-enter, potentially collapsing the plan.
Palestinian Authority role: Meaningful PA participation would enhance legitimacy; exclusion could fuel resentment and spoilers.
Regional follow-through: Actual troop deployments and reconstruction funding would indicate confidence. Delays would signal doubt and hedging.
At best, the proposal could manage de-escalation and buy time for later negotiations. It does not resolve core questions of borders, refugees, Jerusalem, or statehood. At worst, it risks freezing the conflict in a fragile arrangement prone to collapse.
What’s next
October 5–7, 2025: Hamas leadership in Doha expected to issue a formal response, likely tied to clarifications on the PA’s role and limits on Israeli security powers.
October 10–12, 2025: If Hamas agrees, Arab League summit in Cairo to coordinate peacekeeping and funding. Egypt and Jordan seek written U.S. guarantees.
October 15, 2025: UN Security Council session on international monitoring authorization. Russia and China expected not to veto but may abstain, citing sovereignty concerns.
November 2025: Possible start of hostage exchanges and Israeli repositioning. The first test of ceasefire durability.
December 2025–January 2026: Transitional governance structures formed. The PA’s role in the “Board of Peace” will be decisive for legitimacy.
Our take: The proposal is less a peace plan than a test of political will—of Hamas’s survival instincts, Netanyahu’s risk calculus, and Trump’s commitment beyond initial headlines. Its success depends on Hamas accepting major restrictions, regional states committing to uncertain roles, and Palestinians tolerating governance structures devised without their input. Past experience shows externally managed interim deals that sideline sovereignty questions often fail, producing unstable pauses rather than durable solutions. The best outcome is a temporary stabilization driven by exhaustion and U.S. involvement. The more likely outcome is another fragile ceasefire, vulnerable to collapse after the first major security incident, leading back to renewed conflict.